




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# USSR Monthly Review



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**Supplement**

**March 1982**

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# USSR Monthly Review

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**Supplement**

**March 1982**

This codeword supplement to the March issue of the *USSR Monthly Review* is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent a consensus of CIA analysts.

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Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors,

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The authors believe that [ ] article oversimplifies the complicated political process that led to the declaration of martial law in December and understates the difficulty that he will encounter in rebuilding the Polish Communist Party. Moreover, they do not believe there is conclusive evidence that Jaruzelski agreed as early as September to introduce martial law, which would have different implications for Poland's future.		25X1
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## Jaruzelski and the Imposition of Polish Martial Law

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Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski evidently aims to destroy Solidarity and reestablish a stable, Soviet-type regime in Poland. His commitment to the use of force for the destruction of Solidarity began at least two months before he imposed martial law. This commitment reflected his recognition that Moscow was prepared to intervene if the Polish leadership did not act, as well as confidence that Polish forces alone could do it. Jaruzelski's ability to accomplish his aims will depend on his success in restoring the severely damaged Communist Party and its core, the party apparatus; the prospects for this are reasonably good.

The Soviets would hardly have approved martial law unless they were prepared to send in their own troops if the Polish forces proved unable to do the job. Martial law evidently would have been imposed in the late summer of 1981 if First Secretary Kania and the majority of the Politburo had not opposed it.

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### *Initial Anxiety About Jaruzelski*

While Moscow's ultimate weapon in the struggle against Solidarity was Soviet military intervention in Poland, its penultimate and preferred weapon was the use of Polish Army and security forces. Beginning in the spring of 1981, Moscow evidently pressed the Poles to develop firmer military contingency plans for dealing with Solidarity, and this led to coordinated planning by the Polish and Soviet General Staffs.

- On 8 September, at a moment when extreme views were at a high point within the movement, the Solidarity Congress issued a message to "the working people" of the countries of Eastern Europe, offering support for the development of free trade unions.

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### *Jaruzelski Versus Kania on Martial Law*

During the summer, sustained Soviet pressure on the Polish authorities led to increasingly active and intimate combined planning for martial law. In time Jaruzelski came to share the Soviet view that it was necessary to use force to deal with Solidarity.

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- On 14 September the Polish Council of Ministers met. It is reasonable to suppose that the meeting was called to consider the Soviet demand for action and that the Council, with Jaruzelski in the chair, responded by asking the Politburo to institute martial law.

#### *How Jaruzelski Saw Poland's Problem*

Jaruzelski's willingness to institute martial law in mid-September 1981 suggests that:

- He clearly was willing to use force to suppress Solidarity.
- His proposal was made in response to extreme pressure, suggesting that Jaruzelski believed Soviet forces would invade Poland to destroy Solidarity if the Poles themselves refused to act.
- He must have had some confidence that Polish forces would suffice to impose martial law, for a failure would bring about the very Soviet invasion he sought to avert.

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These ideas about Jaruzelski's assessment of the regime's predicament and about his predispositions shed light on his actions in the interval between September and December. Unlike many Solidarity leaders, he credited the Soviet threat to invade; and even while he negotiated with them, he was prepared to use force if necessary in order to suppress their movement.

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#### *Jaruzelski Replaces Kania*

*The Changing Events.* A month after the Politburo had rejected martial law, the Polish Central Committee voted Kania out as first secretary. It voted in General Jaruzelski, who retained the posts of government head and Minister of Defense. The choice of Jaruzelski, rather than a hard-line party apparatchik like Olszowski, suggests that both the Soviets and the Poles now anticipated a military solution to Solidarity's challenge to the regime.

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Jaruzelski himself, in his 24 September government report to the legislature, emphasized that preparations for coercive action by the security forces were going forward: "I have assigned to the Minister of Internal Affairs the task of [undertaking] activity that will be supported, as far as is necessary and appropriate, by specially assigned military forces and means." Solidarity took to heart, at least for the moment, the threats contained in the Soviet message and in the regime's statements. It moderated its positions not only in the proceedings of the second session of the Solidarity Congress, but also on a number of issues under negotiation with the government.

<sup>1</sup> While asserting that the "Government shares the assessments in the Politburo statement," the Council of Minister's communique went on to state that "should an overriding necessity arise it will not shirk from making use of all means that accord with state prerogatives."

<sup>2</sup> Formally the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries.

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As first secretary, Jaruzelski made few changes in the Politburo. He may still have perceived it as an obstacle in December when the decision finally was made. His address justifying martial law did not claim Politburo approval, [REDACTED]

*Jaruzelski's Changing Views.* Moscow presumably intended all along to destroy Solidarity and advocated martial law to this end; but what of Jaruzelski? He evidently came around to the Soviet view some time between early June, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and September. His willingness to impose martial law in September makes it unlikely that when he finally acted in December it was only in response to an ultimatum. Moscow evidently continued to press for such action, but there are no grounds to suppose that after September Jaruzelski offered strong resistance. His failure to do so was doubtless influenced by the knowledge that he too could be replaced, and perhaps also by a perception that in the end Moscow would be satisfied with nothing less.

Jaruzelski may not have been totally committed to martial law and the destruction of Solidarity after September, but his negotiations with Solidarity were clearly deceptive and bordered on bad faith—his 4 November meeting with Archbishop Glemp and Lech Walesa is an example. By then Jaruzelski evidently had decided on the use of force against Solidarity and was not looking for feasible alternatives. [REDACTED]

#### **Determination To Destroy Solidarity**

*Alternatives.* The situation on 13 December, after all, did not necessitate the imposition of martial law. On the contrary, the regime had grounds for hope that it could split the leadership of Solidarity by playing upon deepening differences between the “extremists” and the moderates, led by Walesa. Instead, in early December the Polish media attacked Walesa along with the “extremists,” suggesting that Jaruzelski shared Moscow’s aim—to destroy Solidarity, not moderate it. [REDACTED]

The regime may have been encouraged by Solidarity’s relatively mild response to a provocative police raid on striking fire-fighter cadets in early December. This suggested that its militancy, or its capacity for bold action, was on the decline; and at the same time its popular support was weakening. This would be seen to facilitate the imposition of martial law, but it also provided grounds for persisting in a “soft” strategy (gradually undermining support for Solidarity while isolating the “extremist” elements in its leadership and undermining its capacity for militant action). This strategy entailed far less serious risks than the imposition of martial law, without closing that option if later it proved necessary.<sup>3</sup> [REDACTED]

Why, as the conditions for its success became more manifest, was this strategy not employed? Because Jaruzelski had given up on any softer strategy, either of reaching an accommodation with Solidarity by undermining its “extremist” leaders or of subverting the movement. In December he preferred to destroy Solidarity by force.<sup>4</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> Even if the deepening divisions in Solidarity’s leadership abated and popular disillusionment with Solidarity was reversed, the security forces presumably would have remained a reliable regime tool and the Polish Army would have retained its prestige and disciplined loyalty to the regime. [REDACTED]

<sup>4</sup> Other analysts believe that the split in the leadership of Solidarity increased the pressure on the regime to act because the radical leaders (who were vocally and openly committed to dismantling the Communist system) were gaining ground on the “moderates” who may have been open to compromise. Further, those analysts believe that the realities of Soviet pressure and economic decline did not leave the regime much time for long-term strategies. [REDACTED]

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- Moscow recognizes that the USSR must make substantial economic sacrifices in order to help the military regime feed the Polish people and ultimately restore the economy, but it will provide far less than Jaruzelski needs.
- Both aim to stabilize Polish society and are willing to employ the Soviet Army if the Polish Army proves unable to maintain order. They may disagree on when Soviet military intervention has become necessary.
- Both recognize that Jaruzelski will need to employ the party to implement the military regime's policies, even as he temporarily reduces the party's prominence and its role in policymaking; but Moscow may be more interested in early progress toward the resumption of party rule.
- Both see the need to accommodate the Church and the peasantry, but Moscow may be more determined to restrict the Church's role and to use forcible measures to requisition food from the peasantry. [ ]

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Martial law has disrupted the economy and antagonized both domestic and foreign opinion. Such predictable costs could only have been justified by dire necessity (which, however, was lacking) or by decisive gains to be expected in the struggle to stabilize Polish society. Only the destruction of Solidarity, probably, would warrant the predictable costs of imposing martial law. [ ]

These points of friction are important, but they seem unlikely to destroy Jaruzelski's usefulness to the Soviet Union or the confidence based on his successful imposition of martial law, unless he fails in the essentials: the maintenance of social order and the achievement of martial law's key objective, the destruction of Solidarity. Economic recovery, while clearly important, may not be crucial for Jaruzelski's tenure in the months ahead. [ ]

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#### ***Since December***

Granted that Jaruzelski and Moscow share the objective of effectively destroying Solidarity, there may still be considerable friction between them on important tactical issues, as well as on major policies:

- Both desire to exploit Western economic aid, although to obtain such aid Jaruzelski might be willing to make concessions that would strain Moscow's tolerance.

The imposition of martial law by Polish forces alone has gone at least as well as the Poles and Soviets might have expected, and probably much better. The authorities' willingness to take such action suggests that they discounted the likelihood of effective resistance by Solidarity once the initial action against it had succeeded. Some Western observers speculate that Solidarity may prove able to preserve its organizational integrity and capacity for action under martial law—but the implicit Communist calculation to

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the contrary should not be disregarded. The Communist authorities turned out to be right about the Poles' capacity to impose martial law, and they may prove right about the regime's capacity to defeat Solidarity.

To achieve its aim of defeating Solidarity and reestablishing a stable Soviet-type regime, the Polish leadership under Jaruzelski needs to restore the Communist Party and its core, the party apparatus. This powerful social invention, a creation of Lenin and Stalin, is being rebuilt in Poland after suffering severe damage in the course of the past 18 months. The party apparatus is, of course, an artificial contrivance that does not grow organically from a people's culture but is created by outside forces according to a standard blueprint. When people cease to accept the myths that sustain it and cease to fear its instruments of repression, the party becomes vulnerable. Ruling Communist parties have several times been destroyed or gravely weakened by mass action of the peoples they governed.

But just as its artificiality makes the party apparatus vulnerable to blows from above and below, so does it make for easy rebuilding in favorable circumstances. In China, after Mao died in 1976 his heirs quickly restored rule by the central party organs. In East European countries where the Communist parties were badly damaged or destroyed (East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), they have reconstituted themselves with the aid of the Soviet Army and exercise renewed authority.

This is now being attempted in Poland under martial law, but without the direct involvement of the Soviet Army. The fate of the present regime in Poland may depend on its success in this effort. Even effective military rule may be impossible if the provincial party apparatus does not win back its self-confidence and a measure of acceptance by the Polish population. Moreover, even when martial law ends, military officers will necessarily continue to rule unless the central organs of the party apparatus have been revitalized.

A possible functional equivalent for a massive Soviet Army presence inside Poland in deterring social disorder is the credible threat of a military intervention. After the winter of 1980/81 (when the USSR had threatened to intervene with armed force but did not), many actors on the Polish political scene came to doubt that Moscow had the stomach or the bankroll for an armed occupation of all Poland. Such doubts have now been undermined by the imposition of martial law, which implied Moscow's willingness to back it up if need be. Leaders of the Church, for example, now actively fear Soviet armed intervention and so presumably do other civic figures.

This renewed credibility of the threat of Soviet invasion is a stabilizing force in Polish politics. Even if Solidarity preserves its command structure underground, the fear of provoking Moscow might deter the Polish working class from following its lead in bold actions that could lead to an occupation.

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### Jaruzelski and Martial Law: An Alternative View

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[ ] article is a useful contribution to what will, no doubt, become a substantial literature on the emergence for the first time of military Communism, a system of Communist rule that has just begun to define itself. Analysts in the Office of European Analysis believe, however, that the article has two major shortcomings. [ ]

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[ ] gets bogged down in an analysis of when Jaruzelski came to agree finally with the Soviets that martial law was an imperative for Poland. [ ]

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[ ] less sensitivity for the political environments of East European leaders and for the degrees of sophistication the Titos, Kadars, and Ceausescus of the area have developed over the years in dealing with the Soviets. That Jaruzelski may as early as September have let it be known in Poland that he favored martial law means only that he had taken a position that would divert Soviet and perhaps lower level Polish military pressure from him to Party First Secretary Kania and the Politburo, which he knew would reject such a recommendation. It did not mean, necessarily, that he genuinely favored martial law at that early date, nor does it follow that his subsequent negotiations with the Catholic Church and Solidarity were conducted in bad faith. [ ]

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and what the character of his relations with Soviet leaders will be. In our view, [ ] article is misleading inasmuch as it implies that Jaruzelski was among the first of Poland's leaders to crack under Soviet pressure and that he is against reform of the Polish system of rule. Jaruzelski's actions at the February Central Committee plenum—the first after the imposition of martial law—suggest a man of a different stripe. At that session he decreed that the reform of the party's statutes made the previous summer be retained and that the nomenclature system be opened to Poles who are not members of the Communist Party. [ ]

The most disappointing facet of the article is that the author does not discuss the ramifications of some of his ideas. After asserting that Jaruzelski acted in response to extreme pressure, he does not address the question of Jaruzelski's independence in future situations, given a reduction of Soviet pressure. The assertion that the premier and the other Polish leaders wish to reestablish a stable Soviet-type regime is not followed by a discussion of whether this means Jaruzelski is a creature of the Soviets or a "Polish" Communist. And after noting that in "favorable circumstances" other damaged parties have readily rebuilt [ ] does not consider whether conditions in Poland are likely to be "favorable." [ ]

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Second, the argument that the regime had no need to introduce martial law in December because events were going in its direction lacks a sensitivity for the Polish political scene at that time. [ ] does not mention that by late November the regime suspected from month-long negotiations with Solidarity that no accommodation would be possible on terms acceptable to it, that Walesa had lost undisputed leadership of Solidarity, and that the party was incapable of action—indeed, was rapidly disintegrating. We believe that these key developments, rather than any three-month-old ostensible commitment, led Jaruzelski to impose martial law when he did [ ]

Jaruzelski's performance to date suggests that he is in no hurry to turn power back to the Politburo, and the party appears so divided and demoralized that its recovery seems a long-term project at best. We strongly doubt that the political and economic forces at play will allow a simple return to the status quo ante. [ ] does not address the important questions of what direction Jaruzelski's military Communism—the newest version of national Communism in Eastern Europe—will take and what its longer term implications will be for US policy toward that region, the USSR, and Western Europe. [ ]

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These points are important for what they suggest about where Jaruzelski may lead Poland in the future

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